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I AM pleased to have this opportunity to appear
hefhre von at a time when critical decisions concerning
the future course of economic policy are being made.
For almost 15 years, from the mid—60s to 1980,
Americans endured accelerating inflation. During that
period whenprices rosefrom an annual rate ofless than
two percent to double—digit dimensions, our economy
became afflicted iv problems which increasingly
weakened the industrial andcommercial sinews ofthis
nation. By the end of the 1970s, it became apparent
that we were losing the war against inflation. Our
losses consisted of more than just higher prices; we
sufilired significant declines in productivity, sizable
reductions in investment and savings growth, rapidly
rising interest rates, volatile financial markets, increas-
ingunemployment anda hostof other social problems
Toward the end of 1979. the Federal Reserve took
decisive steps to halt the rising growth in money that
had spawned the inflation. its goal became disinflation
— a gradual reduction in the rate of mflation through a
gradual reduction in the growth ofthe money supply.
Today, after nearlythree years ofthe new policy, we
seem to be on the threshold of success. ~or the first
time in several years, inflation has dropped substan-
tially. So far this year, on an annual basis, prices have
risen only about 5 percent, a significant improvement
over the double—digit figures of a few years ago.
Unfbrtunatelv, however, at the very moment of
meaningful progress, we are beingbesieged hy a vane-
tv ofeconomic ills that are severely testing our resolve
to continue the fight. Among these are: increased un-
employment, high interest rates, sharply reduced
housing and construction activity, falling commodity
prices, low rates of saving and investment, aud what
some observers see as a declining competitive advan-
tage flir our products in foreign markets.
It is becoming increasingly popular in some circles
to attribute our current economic ills toour disinflation
efilirts. Almost daily we are inundated iv articles with
titles like ‘How Disinflation Hurts Us All,” “The Costs
of Disinflation,’’ or, even more alarming, ‘‘The Curse
of Disinflation.” Congressmen have been quoted as
equating our current anti—inflation efforts to the PLO’s
efilirts in West Beirut, hinting that, ifcontimied, our
disinflation policies will reduce the nation’s economy
to a pile of rubble. When the Chairman ofthe Federal
Reserve System recently appeared beflire Congress,
he was urged to “considera major change in monetary
policy before it is toolate.” Bills havebeen introduced
in Congress to fliree the Federal Reserve to abandon its
efilirts to reduce monetary growth and to revert to
interest rate targeting — the very’ same procedure that
produced our past inflation.
in the faceofthis sort ofprodding, itis notsurprising
that more and more people are asking whether the
time has indeed come flir us to move away from disin-
flation and reinflateourway backto more prosperous
times. It is this issue that I would like to discuss with
you.
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Now, Ia mnot going to tell you that disinflation is
without its costs. It is not costless. To bring down and
hold down inflation after 15 years of soaring prides
requires a major o~’erhaulingofour economic system.
And, as in any major overhaul, there will he a certain
amount of downtime — a temporary reduction in
outputand a rise in unemployment — as we retool for a
different economic enyironment. However, I want to
stress that this doxyntime, flir most sectors of the econ-
omy, is onlytemporary. It marks a necessary transition
to a stable economicenyironment essential for longer
term growth and prosperity.
Also, it is important to recognize that not all indus-
tries will do well even if inflation is halted. Some will
suffer permanent losses — especially those that, for a
variety ofreasons, benefit from inflation. Amongthese
are speculative land and commodity firms, companies
that produce and sell “collectibles” of all kinds, and,
perhaps, even thosepublishing companies that market
books on “how to beat inflation.”
Reform isnever without its costs, but inconsidering
whether the time has really arrived to reinflate, I
would like to pose two questions: First, is disinflation
solelyresponsible forour current economic problems?
Second, canwe solve ourproblems by returning to our
old “inflation as usual” policies? I will argue that the
answer toboth of these questions is “Nd).”
First, let’s consider why disinflation, per se, is not
the sole cause ofour current economic problems. Cer-
tainly disinflation is responsible for some temporary
problems. However, some of our most serious prob-
lems would have occurred even if inflation had con-
tinued; they are the direct result ofa newawareness on
the part ofthe public of the pernicious nature of’ infla-
tion and peoples actions to attempt to protect them-
selves from some of its effects.
in the early 1970s, when serious inflation was a new
experience for most Americans, people tended to view
rising prices as a temporary phenomenon that, like an
old soldier, would somehow fade away. While no one
in retrospect would question that the decade of the
1970s was one of rising inflation, many’ people at that
time hehaved as if inflation either didn’t exist or, at
least, wouldnt persist. Being unconditioned to infla-
tion, they totally failed to anticipate either the extent
or the duration oftheproblem. As a result many people
— perhaps you andI included — continued tosave and
lend money at interest rates that failed to compensate
for our loss of future purchasing power that came
about as a result of inflation. This was true even for
many sophisticated financiers whose activities in-
fluence interest rates.
As a result, the real interest rate that sayers and
lenders received — the actualreturn after adjustingfor
the impact ofinflation — was riotonly ridiculously low
during the inflationary 70s, it was negativefhr much of
the decade. Now, whenever the realrate of return on
financial assets — such as bonds, savings accounts and
the like—isunrealistically low—or even worse, when
it is negative — people who hold financial assets — the
savers — end up poorer and people who sell financial
assets to them — the borrowers — end up wealthier.
During the 1970s, people who borrowed funds to
purchase tangible assets — houses, ears, land, gold,
etc. — did well; those who lent funds did badly. Of
course, nobody planned it that way. It was, however, a
predictable result of the public’s failure to recognize
the true nature and extent of inflation.
To illustrate how this works, let’s take a simple ex-
ample. Consider two individuals, each of whom ex-
pects the rate ofinflation to average 5 percent per year
over the next ten years. Let’s further assume that the
competitive real rate of interest at that time (i.e., the
actual return above the rate of inflation) is 3 percent
per year. If one borrows 8100,000 from the other to
purchase ahouse, theborrower would he willing to pay
(and the lender would expect to receive) an 8 percent
interest rate on the loan—S percent tocompensate for
expected inflation and 3 percent to provide a desired
real return.
Suppose, however, that the actual rate of inflation
over the ten yearperiod turned out to he 9 percent per
year, instead of tile 5 percent that was originally ex-
pected and factored intotie loan. Ifthis happened, the
lender would be the loser. He would he receiving 8
percent each year on an investment that was eroding in
value, due to inflation, at 9 percentper year. Instead of
a positive real rate of return of 3 percent, he would he
losing one percent in terms of his annual real rate of
return.
On the other hand, the borrower would he doing
unexpectedly well, lie would he paying 8 percent
annual interest on a house that was appreciating in
value at 9 percent per year— arid getting a real return
from living in it as well. In times ofunexpected infla-
tion, the lender’s loss is the borrower’s gain. And many
people hilled to compensate for this factor during the
inflationary 1970s.
However, as this disparity between individual rates
of return on real versus financial assets hecame in-
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creasingly noticeahle over time, people became
attuned to the meaning of inflation and took steps to
protect themselves against it. They did this by pur—
chasing tangihle assets such as houses, land. commod-
ities of all kinds — and by refraining from purchasing
financial assets that were depreciating in value.
Itwas simplya situation ofpeople awakening towhat
was happening and adjusting their investments tocoin-
pensate fUr some of the eflUcts of inflation As a con-
sequence, land values increased dramatically. Hous-
ingprices, on average, rose 2.5 percent per yearfaster
than the rate of inflation. Inventories hecame one of
the hest ways to hold corporate wealth. Commodity
prices soared — the price of gold alone rose nearly 21
percent per year above the rate of inflation. Even if
OPEC had not existed, petroleum products would
have been aboom industry. On the other hand, finan-
cial markets foundered. Investors in bonds and money
market instruments earned negative real rates of re-
turn ranging from -0.2 to -0.5 percent per year.
The consequences were inevitable: savers gotpoor-
er and the supply of credit declined; borrowers got
wealthier and the demand for credit rose. As a result,
realinterest rates began to rise. Moreover, the public
got smarter; after 15 years of living with inflation,
people finally canie to realize the extent and persist-
ence ofthe problem and adjusted their economicdeci-
sions so as to reduce, as much as possible, the disloca-
tions that inflation produces. Both savers and lenders
learned to insist on a return that would preserve their
purchasing po’ver as well as compensate them for the
greater risk of lending during a period of uncertain
inflation. And all of this, of course, put even further
upward pressure on real interest rates.
By the hegmmng of the 1980s, inflation awareness,
not inflation naivete, dictated the direction offinancial
dealings. Real interest rates became positive and the
benefits people had previously enjoyed from borrow-
ing to acquire real assets evaporated. As a result, cer-
tain sectors ofthe economy such as housing, land spec-
ulation, commodity purchases, etc., that had previous—
lv heen subsidized iv invalid and erroneous infla-
tionary anticipations began to experience a decline.
Similarly, gold prices fell, while bonds and money
market instruments finally began yielding positive real
rates of return.
What happened, in a nutshell, was that the public
learned to recognize and anticipate the effects of
changes in the rate of inflation and, as a result, is now
hetter prepared to adjust its economic decisions ac-
cordingly’. It is that adjustment process, and not the
process of disinflation itself, that accounts fUrcurrent
relatively high interest rates and most of tie disloca-
tions that haveoccurred in the economy. And it is that
adjustment process that has important implications fUr
assessing whether reinflation would provide any relief
from our current prohlemns.
The issue, thereflire, is what will we gain if we
abandon our dfisinflation eflirts? Can we reinflate our
way back to more prosperous times?
To some extent, advocates of reinflation are simply
victims of mnisplacecl nostalgia or selective amnesia.
Critics of today’s disinflation policies seem to have
flirgotten that the 1970s were not good years for this
nation. During the inflationary 1970s real economic
growth fell about 25 percent below what it bad been
during the l960s; the unemployment rate, which had
averaged less than 4 percent in the lasthalfof the 60s,
averaged 7 percent from 1975 to 1979. Long-tenn
interest rates, whichhad averaged less than sixpercent
during the late 60s, reached double-digit levels by the
end of the l97Os. It was precisely these problems that
led us to embark on the struggle against inflation. It is
precisely these long-run consequences ofhigher infla-
tion that we can expect to return to if we dlO opt to
reinflate.
Of course, there are some who feel that a return to
reinflation is necessary to bring relief to certain indus-
tries that have severely suffered during the disinflation
effort, such as the housingand construction industries.
Thatreinflation would accomplish this iswishful think-
ing!. As I’ve explained, the gains that inflationproduced
for housing and similarly affected sectors during the
l970s arose from the flict that interest rates did not
correctly reflect the full impact of inflation.
Today, however, the public has developed an infla-
tion awareness that would pre~’d~nt this from happening
again. The public is now fully aware that it canprotect
the value of its assets only’ iv anticipating changes in
the future rate ofinflation. Consequently, if’the public
were to believe that reinflation was imminent, interest
rates would increase to protect investors’ realreturn.
Any anticipated reinflationarv gains to the housing in-
dustry, or to any other interest—sensitive sectors of the
economy’, would be doomed iv upward adjustmnentsin
interest rates resulting from heightened inflationary
expectations.
This is why I fimucl the current clamor fUr reinflatiomu
so disturbing. it is not just that there is no evidence
that excessive monetary expansion would bring the
results its advocates seek; it is rather that pressure for
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reinflation raises doubts in people’s mindis as to
whether inflation will continue to decline. In view of
the rising sentimnent for reinflation, it is not surprising
that people remain skeptical as to the extent of our
current commitment to disinflatiomi. Many of the sav-
ers and lenders who wereso badlyburned in the 1970s
understandably are sensitive to what they read and
hear that implies a potemutial weakening of our resolve
to continue the struggle against imuflation.
Just recently, the American Bankers Association re-
leased a long-range inflation fbreeast predicting an
average inflation rate of mnore than 9 percent per year
over the next ten years. The latest Harris poll of husi—
nessexecutives shows that manyofthosepolled expect
inflation to begin rising within one year. Ifbankers and
business executives aren’t convinced that disinflation
will continue, we canhardly expect to convince lend-
ers and savers that this will happen.
The solution to this problem, and the cballenge
flicing us for the future, is to make our anti—inflation
policies credible to a disbelieving public. There are
several thimugs that would contribute muightily to this
effort. First, our current mnonetary policy’ stance mnumst
he maintained; there mumst he no, evemu temporary,
reinflation “relapse.” Second, federal deficits must he
reduced significantly. I say this not because I believe
that deficits by themselves cause inflation — they do
not. I say it because smaller federal deficits would
reduce the “temptation”facing mnomuetary authorities to
monetize a portion ofthe deficit. Finally, theAmerican
public must he prepared to resist pressures for policy-
makers torevert to reinflation in order to alleviate the
temnporary pain of the process of disinflation. Omuly
when people become convinced that our anti-inflation
fightis “for real” andwill he pursued overa longperiod
oftimne, will inflation finally be eliminated and stabil-
ity, so necessary for economic growth, he restored.
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